In TV studios, on Twitter feeds and in living spaces across the greater Philadelphia location, people wish to know: Why doesnt Joel Embiid just ruin the Boston Celtics in the post? Hes unstoppable down there, after all, and Boston often appears to be at a significant size downside.
Why dont we simply see him do all the time what he did in the very first quarters of Games 1 and 2?
During the Game 2 broadcast, TNT expert Stan Van Gundy consistently made note of how Embiid was not getting his touches close enough to the rim. Thats a long-running pattern. The Celtics have regularly required Embiid to catch the ball further away from the basket than he has against other teams, according to Second Spectrum data provided to FiveThirtyEight. His average post catch in all routine season and postseason video games against non-Boston teams has come 13.8 feet far from the rim, compared to 14.5 feet in all games versus Boston. (And its 14.9 feet in simply the playoff video games against Boston.) An additional foot or two may not appear like a lot, but it can be the distinction between a simple layup and having to force a hook shot over the top of a protector.
In part since the Celtics are so proficient at pressing him off his spots, the Sixers have actually also taken longer to go into the ball to Embiid in the post versus the Celtics than they have versus other groups, usually waiting 3.1 seconds against the Celtics versus 2.7 seconds versus other groups. And when Embiid really gets the ball down low, the Celtics have actually done a better task preventing fouls than other groups, fouling Embiid on only 14.4 percent of his post-ups compared with 18.5 percent versus everybody else, per Second Spectrum. Boston has actually required Embiid to pass the ball from the post regularly too, getting him to provide it up 28.9 percent of the time, or 3.2 percentage points more frequently than he has passed against other teams.
You can blame Embiid himself for simply not being assertive enough. You can blame 76ers coach Brett Brown for not drawing up imaginative adequate ways to get Embiid the ball in beneficial positions. Credit Bostons defense.
Why does Embiid bring a field-goal portion of simply 44.1 in 17 regular-season and playoff games against Boston over the previous 3 seasons but make chance ats a 47.8 percent clip overall because timespan? And why have the Sixers balanced only 1.049 points per belongings against Boston on trips that include an Embiid post-up throughout that time– the fourth-worst figure theyve recorded against the 21 opponents whom Embiid has posted a minimum of 50 times?
How does Boston deal with Embiid post-ups? Why do the methods executed by Brad Stevens and business give the Sixers trouble?
What the Celtics want to avoid is Embiid just backing his male into the stanchion and easily laying it in. Once they get him far enough out on the flooring that he has to turn and face the rim, whoever is securing the Sixer one die from Embiid tones assist toward him. If Embiid puts it on the flooring, the helper comes all the way over, and everyone else moves position accordingly. Its a great deal of work, created to make Embiid himself put in a great deal of work to get the ball in the basket.
In the clip above, Jayson Tatum and Enes Kanter flawlessly performed a switch on a back screen for Embiid, set by James Ennis. It helped that they knew Ennis was not the target of the play, so they might just neglect him. Tatum let Ennis set his screen and cut to the opposite side of the court, and Tatum hardly moved. He remained where he was so he could bump Embiid on his way down and provide Kanter time to recuperate to the block. Then, as quickly as Embiid captured and relied on face the rim, Marcus Smart was right there to require a deflection and double-team. This, too, is a pattern: Boston has sent a double team at Embiid in the post 20 percent more often than the other 28 teams in the league over the past three seasons, per Second Spectrum.
It assisted the Celtics there that the Sixers had Ben Simmons, who is not a jump-shooting danger, as one of the two gamers already on the weak side, which is how Theis might feel comfortable not securing Harris at all as he made his method across the floor. Without many shooters on the flooring, the Celtics had the freedom to carry out the rest of their plan.
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The Sixers, obviously, understand all this, therefore does Embiid. They have been seeing it in action for several years now. They have actually sometimes shown a willingness to swing the ball side-to-side and get Embiid great position on duck-ins, however that desire tends not to last, and soon they are back straining to make entry passes on stagnant post-ups.
Now down 2-0 in the series, the Sixers require to discover some responses. Versus Boston, theyre unlikely to come all that quickly.
In part because the Celtics are so great at pushing him off his areas, the Sixers have likewise taken longer to go into the ball to Embiid in the post against the Celtics than they have against other groups, normally waiting 3.1 seconds versus the Celtics versus 2.7 seconds versus other groups. And as soon as Embiid actually gets the ball down low, the Celtics have actually done a better job preventing fouls than other teams, fouling Embiid on only 14.4 percent of his post-ups compared with 18.5 percent against everyone else, per Second Spectrum. The objective seems to be to require Embiid as far away from the rim as possible prior to he gets the ball; then, as soon as he catches the ball, plant as many bodies as possible between Embiid and the rim. They know Embiid wants to publish up, and they know the Sixers want Embiid to publish up, so they twist themselves to guarantee that he does not get too beneficial a match. If Embiid even steps foot in the paint, the closest assistance defender slides over to reject an entry pass till the man guarding Embiid can steel himself enough to force Embiid off his spot.
What Boston does is both basic and complex. The goal appears to be to force Embiid as far from the rim as possible before he gets the ball; then, once he catches the ball, plant as many bodies as possible in between Embiid and the rim. When it comes to carrying out pre-post-up switches, the Celtics are extraordinarily collaborated. They know Embiid wants to publish up, and they understand the Sixers desire Embiid to publish up, so they contort themselves to make sure that he does not get too helpful a matchup. (Theyll even switch during a post-up, and they can pull it off.) They want their center safeguarding Embiid when he lastly touches the ball on the block if at all possible.
If Embiid even steps foot in the paint, the closest aid protector slides over to reject an entry pass up until the guy securing Embiid can steel himself enough to require Embiid off his area. Once they handle to push him further away from the basket, the Celtics do definitely whatever they can to ignore the non-shooters. In the montage below, focus on the number of times 2 Celtics were defending 3 Sixers on the weak side while 2 were on Embiid. Simmons, Al Horford, Matisse Thybulle … anybody who isnt a plus shooter gets the full Tony Allen treatment.
If the Celtics cant get their center to Embiid by the time the entry pass is teed up, then they change off the ball to make certain the center is helping underneath the rim instead of stuck on the boundary. In the clip below, Gordon Hayward, Jaylen Brown and Daniel Theis performed a three-way switch so that despite the fact that Embiid was posting the much smaller Brown, the Celtics could feel comfy understanding that Theis was the one supplying help near the rim.
